Conflict Resolution between Russia and the West: Taking a Step Back
Director of the PRIO Cyprus Centre, an independent, bi-communal research centre whose aim is to contribute to an informed public debate on key issues relevant to an eventual settlement of the Cyprus problem, Dr. Harry Tzimitras says relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West are being portrayed as a revival of the Cold War.
“I don't know if we've reached that far in our assessment,” he comments. “However, it certainly is the first real crisis inflaming security, but also economics, politics and strategy that we've seen since the breakup of the former Soviet Union.
“In a sense it's a clash of understandings, but also a struggle between two poles of power,” says Dr. Tzimitras. “I think that Ukraine itself is a tangible facet of this antagonism, and it's an antagonism not only inflaming Russian – Western relationships, but also a reflection of the abilities of coalitions like NATO or the European Union to deliver in the challenges of the modern era. In a sense, it's a stress test for such alliances and coalitions, both in terms of values and also in practical, strategic terms.”
However challenging, he says it's nothing that cannot be resolved eventually. “But I think it's going to introduce the need to re-think the fundamental premises of things that we've taken for granted for a very long time.”
Given that backdrop, Dr. Tzimitras offered his insights to Natural Gas Europe on the prospects for de-escalating tensions between the West and Russia and how their gas relationship can be maintained. Energy, he says, might even eventually serve as a platform for cooperation between the sides.
What are your thoughts about the natural gas relationship between Russia and Europe?
As things stand, I think Europe has either been drawn or allowed itself to be drawn into a great imbalance in its energy relationship with Russia, whereby now we can even talk about the dependency of Europe on Russian gas.
At the same time, the political risk between Russia and Europe introduces a new challenge in the relationship. Energy could be one of the first pillars that could suffer under this. So, effectively, Europe's actions, like the embargo for instance vis-à-vis Russia, are going to introduce direct challenges to the European setting as we knew it; for some countries that are absolutely dependent on Russian gas more, for some countries less.
The fact that there is this crisis between Russia and the EU, combined with other crises, like the one between the EU and Turkey, pushes Turkey into the arms of Russia and Russia into the arms of Turkey. It remains to be seen how two leaderships that are portrayed in the West as very particular, might elect to cooperate, while Europe will have to live with the consequences of this.
It's good that you're optimistic about the resolution of these tensions. However, if things were to go the other way, how would you assess the threat of Russia shutting off its gas deliveries to Europe?
Perhaps things could escalate a little bit further, but eventually they are not expected to escalate beyond repair, because I think no one is better off with an ultimate crisis and everybody knows it. It's more of a testing of the waters on both sides.
Were there to be such an eventuality, I think then we would have a very serious problem. Energy might not be the most serious of concerns then. For instance, in countries like the Baltics, where the physical security challenge has been viewed as a priority, I think there is a real fear in some of the states – particularly Estonia – over potential Russian actions in the future.
So I think it's going to make things more difficult, but I don't think energy will be our major concern if things were to escalate.
All that said, I think it's high time that Europe re-evaluates its priorities regarding energy security. This might mean relationships with other countries; it might mean the reorganization of ways of accessing energy; and it might mean resetting the priorities. One of the top such, would be to reconsider a host of premises of energy security and that would entail perhaps opening up to the possibility of Turkey, in particular, being engaged, rather than pushed away.
What then do you consider the best prospects for normalizing the European – Russian gas relationship?
I think the gas relationship is just going to be a reflection of other relationships. I don't think it's going to be the one platform on which Russia and Europe are going to discuss – it's a gamut of issues. Energy perhaps could serve this role in a more regional sense, for instance it could be an excellent platform for cooperation for the South-eastern Mediterranean, and even eventually serve as a basis for a rapprochement between countries such as Israel and Turkey. But energy would only be one facet of a very complicated relationship that Russia is enjoying at the moment with the West, and I don't think it's the most fundamental one.
In this respect, it is Europe that depends on Russian energy and not the other way around, but of course we've also seen the outcome and effect of European sanctions in the Russian economy, which are not negligible; I think actually they're much more severe than initially evaluated by Moscow.
So I think after this show of power, both sides are going to find a viable way of co-operating over Ukraine, and beyond that, re-evaluating their own relationship in the region.
What obstacles do you see towards normalizing relations – both in general and concerning gas?
One of the problems is that things have been allowed to escalate, and now it's a matter of taking a step back, which of course becomes quite a challenge in itself. This is true for Russia, as it is for EU politics, as well as domestic politics in quite a number of countries, including those taking a lead on this like Germany, or others that depend on this relationship.
I think it's quite important to rethink a common EU policy on this, which I'm afraid I can't always see in the field of foreign and security policy. The EU has started to act like what it hopes to be: a common political union. It's high time that member states, and particularly those of greater consequence, start seeing eye-to-eye and prioritizing EU duties to the domestic. In many cases, domestic politics, including electoral ones, have not contributed to restarting a dialogue along these lines, but I think it's important we do it now before things are allowed to escalate further and the gap deepens.
We hear a lot about how important it is to diversify European gas sources and routes, but how much could those actions alleviate the situation? Do they aggravate the Russian side, or how do you believe they interpret it?
I think the Russian side is very well aware of the fact that at the moment energy is possibly the strongest negotiating chip Russia has. On the other hand, time is of the essence because we have new opportunities arising, like new LNG facilities for instance, possibly even within the year, springing up in places like Australia and Canada. We also have a decreasing demand in Southeast Asia, freeing up available energy for consumption elsewhere.
So what I'm saying is, it might primarily be a financial consideration whether we were to import gas from elsewhere – it's not unthinkable, especially when a security relationship comes up. It's important to give the message that, as convenient as it might be for Europe to use Russian gas, it is not inconceivable that we could explore other potential extractive countries all around the world. It might be somewhat more costly, but it would also carry with it independence, if relations with Russia were to deteriorate.
However, I think the Russians have also shown realism on a number of occasions. If that could be used as a negotiating point, just indicating that there are other venues but we simply still elect to stay in the relationship as it is, I think energy could perhaps serve as a platform for a better understanding and rapport between the West and Russia.
In financial terms, a rapprochement would be financially beneficial to both, but, more importantly, it would itself pave the way towards a better understanding and cooperation in other fields as well.
Your organization seeks to make peace between the Greek and Turkish regions of Cyprus. Are there any takeaways from that situation that can be applied to the standoff between Russia and the West?
The Cypriot experience might perhaps not be the best example in the sense that energy issues have exacerbated the existing conflict rather than being used as a way out of it and a platform for cooperation and reconciliation. There has been less than full willingness shown to use resources as a basis for understanding leading to a win-win outcome. Rather, energy has led to further disagreements and has become yet another link in the chain of problems that make up the Cyprus issue.
Cyprus has traditionally been a theater of confrontation between great powers, between East and West, in political,financial and in strategic terms. The Republic of Cyprus itself is facing for the first time a clash between its bilateral obligations and relations to Russia and its multilateral obligations to the European Union, through the economic embargo that the EU has imposed in the case of Russia – torn between two traditional poles of friendship and security. They're juggling at the moment and doing an OK job, but it's a relationship that could eventually become even more complicated and taxing.
It's important not to allow such clashes to be multiplied and transposed to other relationships like the European – Russian one at the moment as this could potentially undermine EU solidarity and the very essence of the EU project
And given your expertise in the region, what's your interpretation of the “Turk Stream” project that would deliver Russian gas to and through Turkey? What do you think it could mean for European gas diplomacy?
Turkey at the moment is experiencing a lot of frustration regarding its EU relationship and the political leaderships in both Russia and Turkey have a shared feeling in this area, so it's both a matter of pragmatism in relations between them. Turkey spends around $67 billion to import energy and that accounts for about 28% of its external deficit, so it's very eager to secure energy access, not only in financial terms, but also strategic ones.
On the other hand, Russia of course has a very important potential economic relationship to Turkey. There is now discussion between the two of Russia building one or two nuclear plants at a price tag of at least $20 billion each. Then of course you see both the financial and strategic aspect of this.
I don't think we should be exaggerating things as they stand, because nothing concrete has been planned beyond the signing of a couple of memorandums of understanding, but I think it's a very clear indication of the way in which the political elites in both countries might wish to go.
If this is the case, then the triangular relationship between the three, but also the bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU and Russia and the EU are going to be seen under a very different potential light. The financial relationship might entail a political relationship and I think Europe has to be ready to live with the consequences of this action of having pushed both countries away – perhaps for very good reasons – but the end result remains the same.
It's the wish of Russian and Turkish leaderships to indicate that there are alternatives to the European Union – it's not a one-way street. And this is a very powerful symbolic message, but one that I think is not of negligible financial aspects.
It is up to the EU to not follow a short-sighted policy on this. It's a serious challenge that needs to be tackled now, not tomorrow, because the whole region is potentially very unstable. There are gaps that need to be filled somehow.
Turkey wishes to realign itself with certain countries, to reclaim a role possibly in the region and it's much better to have it engaged rather than alienated.
-Drew Leifheit