Georgia's Endeavours for Alternative Gas Supply: Implications for the Regional Energy Map
Georgia’s gas sector
During 1996-2003, Russian ITERA was a main gas supplier for Georgia and owner of its natural gas distribution companies. As of 2002, Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration sought to alienate ITERA from Georgia’s gas sector. In 2002, Russian Gazprom took over the natural gas sector from ITERA and the control over the main gas pipelines. The pro-western Georgian opposition did not welcome this due to its implications for the Shah Deniz project and the Russian monopoly in Georgia. Russia on the other hand was dissatisfied with the presence of Western energy companies in the region.1 Before 2008, the Russian gas price for Georgia was $235 per 1000 m3 (the most expensive price in CIS).2 In 2006, after deterioration of relations, the gas prices were gradually increased from $63 to $235,3 with Russia buying Turkmen gas at $100 and selling it to Georgia at $230.4
As of 2007, Azerbaijan started to supply Georgia with natural gas from the Shah Deniz field, which decreased Georgia’s dependence from Russia. However, Gazprom is still supplying gas to Georgia as a part of 10% transit fee for gas exported to Armenia through Georgia via the North-South Caucasus gas pipeline. SOCAR-Energy Georgia bought Georgia’s natural gas distribution companies in 2008 and ITERA-Georgia in 20125 and hence controls the entire natural gas distribution system of Georgia, including the Georgian section of NorthSouth pipeline.6
Azerbaijan supplies 87% of Georgia's gas consumption via the South Caucasus Pipeline from Shah Deniz and the Gazimohammed-Tbilisi pipeline (or Hajigabul Gardabani with over 2.5 bcm/y7 capacity) from SOCAR. Georgia collects a 5% transit fee from SCP. After completion of TANAP and TAP, resulting in an additional transportation of 16 bcm of Azerbaijani gas, from current 6 bcm from Shah Deniz I, Georgia’s collected transit fee will increase. Thus, Georgia can receive additional 800 mcm of gas (5% of 16 bcm) as a transit fee.8 If supply from Shah Deniz is increased up to 30 bcm, Georgia could receive 1.5 bcm for transit fees, plus 500 mcm in a preferential price and additional 500 mcm social gas,9 resulting in Georgia being fully supplied by Azerbaijan.
Russia-Georgia gas talks and Azerbaijan’s reaction
Since late 2015, Georgian Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze has met Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller several times and discussed the purchase of additional gas from Russia through Georgia’s commercial sector.10 Kaladze justified this with Georgia’s diversification plans, the lack of gas supply from Azerbaijan11 and the increasing gas consumption of Georgia’s commercial entities.12 He said that, "it is not feasible to increase gas supply through 'Gazakh' pipeline, therefore Georgia sought to balance its demand via import from Gazprom."13 However, SOCAR-Georgia denied that, stating that Azerbaijan can completely satisfy Georgia's gas needs.14
Another reason behind Georgia's attempts to buy Russian gas was the provision of newly built thermal power plant (TPP) in Gardabani region with 250-300 mcm of gas.15 The additional demand for gas for the TPP required new negotiations, as it is not included in the framework of current agreements between Georgia and Azerbaijan. According to Deputy Energy Minister Natig Abbasov, Georgia did not request the revision of the gas purchase agreement for gas prices and Azerbaijan is in fulfilment of its obligations on gas supply.16
While Georgian President Giorgi Margerashvili urged for a reexamination of gas negotiations with Gazprom, the Government did not follow suit.17 On the contrary, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili visited Azerbaijan in October 2015 and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Georgia in early November 2015.18 In Georgia, President Aliyev underscored that Azerbaijan’s gas resources can not only meet domestic demand, but also that of Europe.19 In Tbilisi, President Aliyev reiterated the strategic significance of relations in a Joint Declaration with the Georgian President, where they committed to a high level dialogue on energy issues and the Southern Gas Corridor; the gasification of Georgia’s regions and securing the reliable gas supply for Georgia.20
Opposition towards Russia-Georgia energy talks
Energy Minister Kaladze called the talks with Gazprom commercial and harmless to the energy security of the country and strategic relations with Azerbaijan. However, the Georgian opposition party United National Movement opposed this statement and called to convene the National Security Council of Georgia to discuss compatibility of importing Russia gas with the country's national security, and furthermore condemned the supposed damaging of relations with Azerbaijan as well as the import of Russian gas, given Russia’s presence in Georgia's breakaway territories. They warned that Russia could use the gas supply as a political leverage over Georgia.21 Kaladze responded that the purchase of commercial gas from Gazprom does not imply halting the cooperation with Azerbaijan.
In January 2016, according to Kaladze, Gazprom presented Georgia with a tough ultimatum by requiring "the monetization" of payment for transit of natural gas from Russia to Armenia instead of the previously applied 10% transit fee. Gazprom threatened otherwise to suspend gas transit through Georgia22 and supply Armenia through Iran.23 Journalist Gela Kalandadze said that the "Georgian government found itself between 'bad and very bad' choices. If Gazprom suspends gas transit to Georgia, it will destabilize the energy balance of the country, gas tariffs will rise, which will produce discontent among the people and the decline of popularity of Georgian Dream”.24
According to Professor Tornike Sharashenidze, "replacing Azerbaijani gas with Russian gas is extremely dangerous. Thanks to its strategic partnership with Baku, Tbilisi reduced its dependence on Gazprom and became an important energy corridor". The Georgian government contradicted by pointing out aspects of diversification and increase in transit gas to Armenia. It is suspected that former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili advocated a more Russia friendly course,25 given his alleged equity holding in Gazprom26 and his business connections in Russia,27 The internal divergence within the government and its coalition partners might have supported that turn. When President Margevelashvili called to re-evaluate the talks with Gazprom, Garibashvili hailed the importance of maintaining dialogue with Russia. Perhaps with evolving foreign policy, Georgia wanted to mitigate Russia’s tough stance over country’s pipeline network by purchasing a small volume of gas from Gazprom or merely aspire competitive prices from a new supplier.28
Problems sorted
Following Kaladze’s statement that Russia offered lower gas price than Azerbaijan29, SOCAR’s President Rovnag Abdullayev visited Tbilisi in January 2016 and met with Prime Minister Kvirikashvili and Energy Minister Kaladze, where they discussed the technical aspects of gas supply30 leading to an agreement to increase Azerbaijan’s gas supply to Georgia from 6 to 7 mcm/d.31 Between February and March, Azerbaijan expressed interest to invest in gas storage facilities32 and reassured its commitment and ability to supply Georgia with natural gas until 2030 under the new gas agreement between SOCAR and Georgia. This eliminated the need for gas purchases from Gazprom33 with gas prices calculated in relation to the fluctuation in oil prices.34
Georgia will receive additional 500 mcm/y of gas and discounts for social35 and commercial gas36 in accordance with new gas agreement. The gas volume from Shah Deniz will be increased from 800 mcm/y to 1.5 bcm/y through the SCP and up to 1.5 bcm/y from SOCAR through a pipeline via Gazakh district of Azerbaijan. SOCAR CEO Abdullayev offered “an opportunity of buying an additional 500-700 mcm of gas from Shah Deniz”37 promising Georgia a “favorable price” for the total of 3 bcm gas.38 This in turn lead to an agreement with Gazprom to maintain the 10% transit fee for gas destined to Armenia.39
Russian presence in Georgia’s energy sector
In December 2014, Russian Rosneft (through its subsidiary RN-Foreign Projects) purchased 49% of Petrocas International Energy Ltd., a company offering oil wholesale and transportation.40 The controling share of Petrocas is still owned by David Yakobashvili, a Georgian-Russian businessman.41 The strategic assets of Petrocas include an oil export terminal in the Poti seaport (used for Azeri oil shipments) in the Black Sea through its subsidiary "Channel Energy"; 140 service and refuelling stations under the "Gulf" brand42; two oil terminals and storage facilities in Georgia.43. The Poti port is a bottleneck for the delivery of Russian oil to Armenia.44 Georgian opposition groups called the agreement with Rosneft contrary to the "Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia"45 because Rosneft was allegedly involved in oil exploration in the Black Sea coasts of Abkhazia, a breakaway territory of Georgia.46 Moreover, opposition groups were alerted by plans to transfer Energy-Pro Georgia which owns 70% of all power plants and networks in Georgia, from its Czech owners to either Russian Inter-RAO or associates of former Prime Minister Ivanishvili.47
Russia had been trying to secure the Georgian section of the "North-South Pipeline" between Russia-Armenia during the privatization talks of 2005, which would allow Gazprom to connect and control the gas transmission system of Georgia and Armenia with access to Iran,48 extending its existing ownership of the Armenian section of the Iran-Armenia pipeline.49 At the time, the allocation of $70 million in financial assistance for the rehabilitation of Georgia’s pipeline system by the US government delayed the deal and Georgia maintained control of its main strategic asset in its relations with Russia.50 In 2010, the issue raised again, when Azerbaijan’s SOCAR made an offer for the pipeline that was declined by the Georgian government, followed by the decision not to privatize the pipeline51 due to its strategic importance.52
Iranian gas to Georgia
Georgia is also open to the import of Iranian gas. While the Iranian side is optimistic about a common venture,53 based on a preliminary agreement to transport 300-500 mcm of Iranian gas to Georgia through Armenia via the existing pipeline,54 Georgia remains reserved until the signature of a final agreement.55
As Georgia doesn't share common borders with Iran, it needs either Armenia or Azerbaijan for gas transit through either the Iran-Armenia or the Russia-Armenia gas pipelines. The total capacity of the Iran-Armenia pipeline is 1 bcm with Armenia’s gas import from Iran at 500 mcm/a.56 At full capacity, the North-South gas pipeline can deliver 12 bcm57, however, Armenia uses only 2.2 bcm/a of it. By pushing the Iran-Armenian pipeline to full capacity and with reverse flow of the Russia-Armenia pipeline, Georgia could receive half of its gas demand from Iran. However, limited capacity (initiated by Gazprom58), as well as Gazprom’s ownership of the pipeline make the delivery of Iranian gas through Armenia to Georgia problematic.59
The Iran-Armenia pipeline does not end at the Armenian-Georgian border, which necessitates the connection to the Russia-Armenia Pipeline. Thus, for significant amounts, Iran or Georgia would need to construct a new connection, whereas small amounts would not justify investment by either Georgia or Iran. But even in that case, Georgia would remain dependent on Gazprom-operated pipelines in Armenia.60 Even if there were a reverse flow option, Gazprom, which owns Armenia's entire gas distribution network through Gazprom-Armenia, wouldn't welcome it. The geographically isolated status of Armenia serves Russia’s strategic interests.61
Iran’s plans to construct a new natural gas pipeline through Armenia to Georgia and further to Europe is jeopardized by Gazprom’s ownership of Armenia’s energy sector62 and the impacts of sanctions on Iran. The small gas consumption of Georgia does not economically justify the construction of new pipeline from Meghri to Kvemo-Kartli, unless Iran plans to deliver gas to Europe via this pipeline. The throughput capacity of pipeline would allow pumping 6-7 bcm of gas, which is not vital for Europe.63
Moreover, the price of Iranian gas through Armenia would come with a transit fee, resulting in high gas prices for Georgia. Turkey was paying $487 per 1000 m3 for Iranian gas (even without transit)64 but a 25% premium in Georgia would take away its commercial viability65 even though Georgia remains open for purchases at more competitive prices.66 It would be more lucrative for Iran to pursue high volume exports of gas to Europe through Turkey or as LNG to Asia's markets, and therefore diminishing the chance of Georgia to receive Iranian gas through Armenia.
However, Iranian gas can be pumped through Azerbaijan to Georgia, as there is an operational infrastructure with potentially scalable capacity. Iranian gas might be delivered to Azerbaijan via Iran-Azerbaijan gas pipeline in a reverse flow and injected into SCP. There is an interconnector with 400000m 3 capacity and Gazimohammed-Bind Biand pipeline with 5 mcm in Azerbaijan.67
Moreover, Russia and Iran were discussing a swap of natural gas. Russia could supply natural gas to the North of Iran through Azerbaijan and in exchange have LNG transported to Asian countries from the South of country. In comparison with Armenia, Azerbaijan’s transit status is more favourable for Russia and Iran. In case of Russian gas supply to Iran through Armenia, Russia has to engage with Georgia as the first transit country. In case of Azerbaijan, the country is the only transit country. Moreover, the capacity of the Gazimagomed-Astara-Bind-Biand pipeline (10 bcm) is substantially greater than the capacity of the Russia Armenia and the Iran-Armenia pipelines.68 Russia might still consider the Armenian route in order to block the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey connection.69 Weaker ties between Azerbaijan and Georgia might benefit Armenia. The quadrilateral chain of Russia-Georgia-Armenia-Iran energy relations is of strategic fortune for Armenia.
Conclusion
It remains a puzzle why the Georgian government would turn to Russia for gas imports, while European countries are diversifying their energy supplies. Azerbaijan enabled Georgia to diversify its gas import and decrease gas dependence on Russia, while a turn towards Russian gas would increase Georgia’s previous dependence on Gazprom. If Russia could restore its previous level of gas supply to Georgia, energy contracts might soon reflect Russian interests and would make it difficult for Georgia not to comply with Russia-set terms. Georgia’s gas consumption is not big enough to ensure outside investment in sovereign infrastructure and therefore a renewed dependence from Russia would damage the country’s energy security. Armenia sets a warning example how an energy monopoly can limit strategic options.
If Russia offered cheaper gas to Georgia, the economic motivations were secondary. It is rather a reflection of the political dimension of gas and one could expect such prices to rise soon, looking at the state of Russia’s economy. In the case of Azerbaijan, natural gas is supplied to Georgia directly and therefore at a lower price, without obvious political preconditions. With the most of strategic energy and transport projects of Azerbaijan passing through Georgia, the two countries have become important strategic partners in the region and it would be detrimental if Tbilisi caused a loss in trust in this bilateral relationship. Inconsiderate political decisions and manoeuvres within the Georgian government could deteriorate the regional energy map and could dissuade Georgia away from its Euro-Atlantic path. Given the final agreement between SOCAR and Georgia, it seems Georgia was seeking a new discount for Azerbaijani gas. With the new discount offered by SOCAR and the increasing volume of Azerbaijani gas, Georgia will be able to meet its growing energy demand and the quick solution of gas problems helped the current Georgian government to mitigate the reaction of Georgia's opposition and civil society.
Ilgar Gurbanov is an expert-advisor at the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the country’s first governmental, non-profit think tank. Ilgar is a graduate of the College of Europe and a prolific author on energy and pipeline politics.
This policy brief has been published by the European Centre for Energy & Resource Security (King's College London).
1 Elnur Ismayil, "Enerji Güvenliğinde Gürcistan’ın Jeopolitik Önemi ve Rusya", Bilgesam, December 2015, www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-66- 2015121011268.pdf
2 Marianna Grigoryan, "Georgia Shows Interest in Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline", Eurasianet.org, April 2007, www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav041207.shtml
3 Liana Jervalidze, "Georgia’s State Energy Policy in the Natural Gas Sector", Transparency International Georgia, February 2008, www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/Georgia's%20Policy%20in%20the%20N atural%20Gas%20Sector%20eng.pdf
4 "Нона Михелидзе - Грузия из Европы выглядит так: государство, у которого вообще нет ответа на ряд злободневных вопросов или есть ошибочное видение развития", Interpressnews.ge, October 2015, www.interpressnews.ge/ru/2012-11-26-13-38-46/76116-2015-10-14-09-55-53.html 5 Ismayil, op.cit.
6 Irakli Gogava, "TANAP enlarges Georgia’s energy capacity", Georgian Journal, December 2015, www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/31973-tanap-enlargesgeorgias-energy-capacity.html
7 "Azerbaijan to increase gas exports to Georgia by 22.7%", Intellinews, March 2016, www.intellinews.com/azerbaijan-to-increase-gas-exports-to-georgia-by- 22-7-91790/
8 Nino Patsuria, "Shah Deniz prospects", Georgian Journal, February 2014, www.georgianjournal.ge/business/26241-shah-deniz-prospects.html
9 "SOCAR не учитывает ряд моментов в энергетике Грузии - эксперт", Business Gruziya, October 2015, bizzone.info/experts/2015/1445654240.php
10 Фархад Мамедов, "Газовая схватка Ровнага Абдуллаева в Тбилиси", Haqqin.az, Janurary 2016, haqqin.az/news/61183
11 "Georgian Energy Minister Meets Gazprom CEO in Brussels", September 2015, www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28599
12 "Georgian Energy Minister Speaks of Need to Buy Russian Gas", Civil.ge, October 2015, www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28674
13 Мамедов, op.cit
14 "SOCAR Georgia: АР обеспечивает почти все потребности Грузии в газе", Sputnik.az, ru.sputnik.az/economy/20151022/402452835.html
15 "Azerbaijan has gas for Georgia, but Gasprom to enter this market too", Caspian Barrel, November 2015, caspianbarrel.org/?p=36024
16 "Грузия не обращалась к Азербайджану в отношении изменения соглашения по закупкам", Gruziya Onlayn, November 2015, www.apsny.ge/2015/eco/1446744652.php?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=fa cebook
17 "Президент продолжает настаивать на рассмотрении вопроса отношений с «Газпромом» правительством", Gruziya Onlayn, October 2015, www.apsny.ge/2015/pol/1445799942.php
18 "Зачем Алиев посетит Грузию", GeorgiaNews.org, October 2015, georgianews.org/politika/629-zachem-aliev-posetit-gruziyu.html
19 "О чем говорили Алиев и руководство Грузии?", Haqqin.az, November 2015, haqqin.az/news/56497
20 "Joint Declaration of Presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia", Civil.ge, November 2015, www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28747
21 "ЕНД требует созыва заседания Совбеза в связи с переговорами властей с «Газпромом»", Gruziya Onlyan, October 2015, www.apsny.ge/2015/pol/1444517877.php
22 Георгий Кобаладзе, "Гол Газпрому", Radio Svoboda, January 2016, www.svoboda.org/content/article/27509471.html
23 Заур Расулзаде, "Российский газ в Армению через Иран", Haqqin.az, January 2016, haqqin.az/news/61935
24 Giorgi Menabde, "Gazprom Ups Pressure On Georgia With New Gas Transit Deal", Oil Price, January 2016, http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/WorldNews/Gazprom-Ups-Pressure-On-Georgia-With-New-Gas-Transit-Deal.html
25 Tornike Sharashenidze, "Georgia's Gazprom mystery", European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2015, www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_Georgias_Gazprom_mystery5061
26 "Иванишвили по-прежнему контролирует 1% акций «Газпрома», что является угрозой национальной безопасности - ЕНД", Gruziya Onlayn, May 2014, www.apsny.ge/2014/pol/1400115251.php
27 "Ivanishvili Speaks of Need to ‘Diversify’ Gas Supplies", Civil.ge, October 2015, civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28705
28 "Georgia-Russia Energy Negotiations Cause Controversy", Stratfor, November 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/sample/image/georgia-russia-energynegotiations-cause-controversy
29 "SOCAR and Georgian government start negotiations in Tbilisi", Apa.az, January 2016, en.apa.az/xeber_socar_and_georgian_government_start_nego_237726.html
30 "U.S. Ambassador on Georgia’s Talks with Gazprom", Civil.ge, January 2016, civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28920
31 "SOCAR increases gas transportation to Georgia", Apa.az, January 2016, en.apa.az/xeber_socar_increases_gas_transportation_to_ge_237769.html
32 "SOCAR intends to acquire share in Georgian gas storage facilities", Apa.az, February 2016, en.apa.az/xeber_socar_intends_to_acquire_share_in_georgi_238978.html
33 "Грузия больше не нуждается в дополнительных объемах газа от «Газпрома»", Gruziya Onlayn, March 2016, www.apsny.ge/2016/eco/1457134201.php
34 "SOCAR: Azerbaijan will have no problem in supplying Georgia with natural gas till 2030", Caspian Barrel, March 2016, caspianbarrel.org/?p=40373
35 "Georgia to get additional 500 million cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan", Interpressnews, March 2016, www.interpressnews.ge/en/society/76498-georgiato-get-additional-500-million-cubic-meters-of-gas-from-azerbaijan.html?ar=A
36 Tamada Tales, "Georgia: Azerbaijan Wins Gas Deal Over Russia, Iran", Eurasianet.org, March 2016, www.eurasianet.org/node/77661
37 "Азербайджан на полмиллиарда кубометров в год увеличит экспорт газа в Грузию", Trend, February 2016, www.trend.az/business/energy/2500669.html
38 "SOCAR president: Azerbaijan has sold gas to Georgia for favorable price", News.az, March 2016, news.az/articles/economy/105660
39 "Грузия договорилась с "Газпромом"", Haqqin.az, 05.03.2016, haqqin.az/news/65132
40 "Rosneft and Petrocas Create a Logistics and Retail Joint Venture", Official website of Rosneft, December 2014, www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/29122014.html
41 ""Rosneft" doesn’t violate Georgian law – FM", Trend, January 2015, en.trend.az/scaucasus/georgia/2350616.html
42 "Rosneft to invest in Georgia", OSW, January 2014, www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/rosneft-to-invest-georgia
43 "Russia’s Rosneft acquires 49% stake in Petrocas Energy", TASS, December 2014, tass.ru/en/economy/769814
44 John C. K. Daly, "Georgia Wary of Russia’s Moves on Poti Oil Port", Silk Road Reporters, January 2015, www.silkroadreporters.com/2015/01/15/georgiawary-russias-moves-poti-oil-port/
45 "Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories", Legislative Herald of Georgia, October 2008, https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/19132
46 "Иванишвили по-прежнему контролирует 1% акций «Газпрома», что является угрозой национальной безопасности - ЕНД", Gruziya Onlayn, May 2014, www.apsny.ge/2014/pol/1400115251.php
47 Георгий Двали, Владимир Дзагуто, "Инвесторы выбираются из грузинских сетей", Kommersant, August 2015, www.kommersant.ru/doc/2783426
48 "Зачем Москва заигрывает с Грузией?", Noviy Region, November 2015, nr2.com.ua/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/Zachem-Moskva-zaigryvaet-s-Gruziey- 111636.html
49 Мамед Эфендиев, "Россия рвется в Грузию, подрывая Азербайджан", Haqqin.az, November 2015, haqqin.az/news/57203
50 "Минэнерго Грузии: США помешали Михаилу Саакашвили продать «Газпрому» газопровод", Kommersant, October 2015, www.kommersant.ru/doc/2836511 ; "США ранее запрещали Грузии продавать свой газопровод Газпрому", GeorgiaNews, October 2015, georgianews.org/politika/659-ssha-ranee-zapreschali-gruzii-prodavat-svoy-gazoprovodgazpromu.html#sel=
51 Ismayil, op.cit.
52 "Российский газ по душе Грузии", GeorgiaNews, October 2015, georgianews.org/obshestvo/615-rossiyskiy-gaz-po-dushe-gruzii.html
53 "Iran Likely to Export 200 mcm Gas to Georgia", Shana, February 2016, www.shana.ir/en/newsagency/255312/Iran-Likely-to-Export-200-mcm-Gas-toGeorgia-CEO
54 "Грузия нажала на газ", Novoye-vremya, January 2016, www.novoyevremya.com/w54209/.../#.Vu-nzvmLTIV
55 "Достижение договоренности о поставках газа из Ирана в Грузию оказался фейком", GeorgiaNews, January 2016, georgia-news.org/politika/999- dostizhenie-dogovorennosti-o-postavkah-gaza-iz-irana-v-gruziyu-okazalsyafeykom.html
56 "Энергетическая дипломатия на Южном Кавказе: взгляд из Армении", Sever Yug, March 2016, pcsu.ru/энергетическая-дипломатия-на-южном-к 57 Official website of Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation, http://www.gogc.ge/en/gas-transportation
58 John Roberts, "From Feast to Famine in Azerbaijan", Natural Gas Europe, February 2016, www.naturalgaseurope.com/azerbaijan-caucasus-gas-georgiarussia-gazprom
59 "Possible strengthening of Russia-Iran ties likely to bring Armenia into the equation", ArmeniaNow.com, November 2015, www.armenianow.com/economy/67740/armenia_iran_cooperation_russia_georgi a_gas_azerbaijan
60 Giorgi Lomsadze, "Georgia Struggles to Explain Why It's Dating Gazprom", Eurasianet.org, January 2016, www.eurasianet.org/node/76776?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
61 "Теневое ЦРУ: «Иранский план Саргсяна вызвал гнев Путина»", Haqqin.az, November 2015, haqqin.az/news/56237
62 Eric R. Eissler, "Regional Energy Security: Turkey’s Ambition to Become a Regional Energy Hub", Research Turkey, September 2012, researchturkey.org/regional-energy-security-in-georgia-azerbaijan-and-turkey-isvital-for-turkeys-ambition-to-become-a-regional-energy-hub/
63 "Iranian gas for Georgia will cement Yerevan-Tbilisi ties", Armenian Centre For Society Research, January 2016, www.acsr.am/eng/articles/iranian-gas-forgeorgia-will-cement-yerevan-tbilisi-ties/
64 "Iran's transit fees could be the highest--not just in Azerbaijan but in the whole region", Natural Gas Europe, November, 2015, www.naturalgaseurope.com/iranhighest-gas-price-transit-fee-26366
65 "Georgian Energy Minister Visits Iran", Civil.ge, February 2016, civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28984
66 "Грузия не желает покупать дорогой иранский газ - Каха Каладзе", Gruziya Online, February 2016, www.apsny.ge/2016/eco/1456791128.php
67 "В грузинском направлении политики АР возможно смещение акцентов", Ru.sputnik.az, November 2015, ru.sputnik.az/expert/20151103/402589180.html
68 "Новый газовый план России: “Газпром” может дойти до Персидского залива", Caspian Barrel, October 2015, caspianbarrel.org/?p=35598
69 Надана Фридрихсон, "Под чем подписался Каха Каладзе", Kavpolit, January 2016, kavpolit.com/articles/pod_chem_podpisalsja_kaha_kaladze- 22831/