Israel’s Peripheral Diplomacy Concept and Energy Security in the South Caucasus

Israel’s peripheral diplomacy (or periphery alliances) concept takes roots from the late 1950’s geopolitical context in the Middle East.

The country, isolated then after 1956 Sinai campaign, sought relationships with regional non-Arab states and national minorities, with no formal treaties and agreements between Israel and its counterparts. 

It seems that through years the demand for foreign policy behavioral model similar to peripheral diplomacy came from Israeli political, military and intelligence establishments’ understanding that regional hegemony coming out of battlefield victories and nuclear might is not the easiest challenging responsibility. This understanding prevailed until 1979 revolution in Iran. Iran’s transformation into a strong and extremely hostile to Israel fundamentalist regime in early 1980’s, as well as intensity and richness of geopolitics after collapse of the USSR and emergence of young secular Muslim post-Soviet nations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions revived the concept of periphery for Israel.   

Although Israel is active in all three states of the South Caucasus and in most of the Central Asia, the nature of Israel’s diplomacy, its destination and implementation impose considerable requirements upon local candidates for strategic partnership. For example, Israel has still no embassies in Armenia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only very recently Israeli embassy in Turkmenistan has been established and headed by professional diplomat Shemi Tzur. 

As far as Iran’s nuclear program is on agenda, there are at least two points of rationale for Israel’s activities here: 
•    Countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions neighboring to Iran can transmit useful intelligence to Israel; 
•    Those countries which have borders with Iran may become important in Israel’s direct and indirect military activities against Iran if “X-hour” comes.    

According to Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Washington, D.C.-based Heritage Foundation, Israel’s strategic priorities in this periphery include developing good diplomatic and economic relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia countries, preventing Iran from increasing its influence in the region, and participating in energy projects, including oil and gas imports to Israel”. 

The US Department of Energy assessment of 2007 indicates that the oil and gas production in the Caspian Sea region area is expected to rise by 171% over the period between 2005 and 2030. With $4 billion worth of transactions in 2011, Azerbaijan, the dominant economy providing more than 70% of the South Caucasus GDP, is Israel’s top trade partner among all post-Soviet states. Azerbaijan currently supplies over a third of Israel’s oil supplies: in 2011, it exported to Israel some 2.5 million tons (about 18.5 million barrels) of oil, worth about $2.1 billion. 

Observation is that energy security in the Caspian Sea cannot be analyzed without references to the realities of regional geoeconomics and geopolitics. The same is true from Israel’s foreign policy angle.  

Economically Azerbaijan is the leading state of the region and articulates ambition for military leadership. For Azerbaijan status-quo of frozen conflicts established in middle 1990’s is not the end of geopolitical game in the region, and the same is true for Georgia. In fact both nations suffered Russian backed separatism. There are many things making Azerbaijan and Georgia very different from each other – history, ethnicity, religion, numbers and economic might, evolution of regimes or domestic and foreign policies. But strategic alliance developed between these two nations is very natural. Georgia became Azerbaijan’s single “win or die” door to deliver its resources to the European market via pipelines. SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s state oil monopolist, became the largest tax payer to the Georgian budget and locomotive of Azerbaijan’s investment expansion in the Black Sea region. 

Mutual support for survival and strengthening of independence, refusing to join Russian-centered geopolitical initiatives (like Eurasian Economic Union, Eurasian Customs Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization - CSTO), fostering peace and stability and prevention of separatism and terrorism, common strategy towards external threats (particularly against Russia), supporting one another in the international arena in conflict resolution, and viewing the South Caucasus as strategically important energy and transport hub, placed on the Great Silk Road, – these are the reasons why Azerbaijani–Georgian strategic alliance can also be defined as mutually dependant defensive military-political alliance. 

Security of critical infrastructure like Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipelines is of particular importance, because these are strategic infrastructures vital for sovereign survival of Azerbaijan and Georgia – the US and Israel’s strategic partners in the South Caucasus. This is also important for immediate energy consumption in the South Europe and in Israel. Azerbaijani oil is delivered to Israel from Ceyhan seaport through Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. 

Historic, ethnic and religious background in case of Azerbaijan, historic and geographical background in case of Georgia, together with geographic proximity and evolution of strategic energy transit from the Caspian Sea to Europe brought Turkey an important member of NATO, to the level of strategic alliance with both Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 2010 Baku and Ankara signed “Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance” just days before Yerevan and Moscow signed their own agreement on extension of Russian lease of its military base in Gyumri, Armenia. 

Large has been the US and Turkish input into both, Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independent military capabilities, to neutralize Russian support to Armenia. Critical energy infrastructure security is another aspect in this cooperation, parallel to modernization of Azerbaijani and Georgian armed forces to NATO standards. Major shift happened after 9/11 when the US changed its security policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia region. Azerbaijan and Georgia declared full support to the US global war on terror and campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (by the way, around 30% of the NATO transportation to and from Afghanistan is still done through Baku International Airport).  

Special focus is made in Azerbaijan and Georgia on improvement of education and training of the Armed Forces. In 2002 NATO Prague Summit adopted Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) instrument in order to improve cooperation with the Partner nations. In May 2003 Azerbaijan formally applied for joining IPAP and the request was approved in May 2005. IPAP covers all major political, defense and security related economic, scientific and environmental spheres. Within IPAP framework, and with support from Turkey, Azerbaijanis modified their military education and training system closer to NATO standards. Curricula developed on Turkish examples have been implemented since 2002. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) has been a good platform also for cooperation with NATO, providing exchange of views relevant to understanding national practice. 

Since 2001, each autumn around 40 to 50 officers from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia take part in series of “Eternity” staff exercises, aimed at development of knowledge and skills required for effective oil and gas pipeline protection5. 

In September 2011, more than 30 officers from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Ministry of Interior, Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan, different special forces, participated in a training organized by the Center for Civil-Military Relations of the Naval Post-graduate School (Monterey, USA) on combating terrorism strategy, which included protection of critical energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan.  

In April 2012, Azerbaijan’s State Border Service (SBS) has held tactical exercise in the Caspian Sea with the major emphasis on protecting the oil and gas production areas on islands in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian. The exercise was attended by the SBS Coast Guard’s speed boats and helicopters and the Emergency Ministry. Overall, 1200 troops, 21 vessels, 20 speedboats and eight helicopters participated. The exercise was conducted in three stages and nine tactical tasks were implemented. The first stage involved neutralizing a conventional terrorist group. The group was eliminated with the help of the “Igla” anti-aircraft missile system (journalists suggested that the “terrorist group” was using a helicopter or other aircraft). The second stage involved helicopters and ships which monitored the designated area, and located and destroyed an enemy submarine. The last stage envisioned stopping ships that did not respond to inquiries; sending marines aboard the ships; and then searching for and locating explosives, drugs and components of weapons of mass destruction. Besides the above-mentioned arms and equipment, the exercise used anti-aircraft rocket launchers, heavy machine guns and various missile systems. 

In Israel’s case, support to Azerbaijan and Georgia carries mainly technical character. Information on Israel’s Elbit Systems, Aeronautics Defense Systems, Israeli Aerospace Industries, Israeli Military Industries, Soltam Systems, Tadiran Communications and others cooperation with both of the countries hits news from time to time. There are good examples since the early 2000’s, like Israeli participation in development of security systems around Baku International Airport or training of Azerbaijani high-ranking officials’ bodyguards or joint venture on UAV production in Azerbaijan. 

Israel, as well as Turkey, supported Azerbaijan in July 2001 incident in the Caspian Sea, when Iranian warship threatened Azerbaijani Geophysics-3 oil exploration vessel in the Azerbaijani sector of the sea. Turkey and Israel issued strong statements on the issue. 

Detailed information on nature of cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan/Georgia on critical energy infrastructure security (and other spheres) is secret, what is quite natural, taking into account all the sensitivities. But, there is a common understanding of necessity to expand cooperation. Georgia’s minister of defense Irakli Alasania expressed it like this, commenting on joint US–Georgian military exercise “Agile Spirit” in April 2013: “Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have to establish a format of trilateral cooperation in the defense industry… At this stage, cooperation is limited only to the exchange of information. However, I think we have to work together on interesting issues. Azerbaijan and Georgia are facing similar challenges and have the same priorities: we have to protect the safety of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as well as current strategic projects. This is why I think that defense cooperation will bring a positive result for the security of joint regional projects… We are also going to deepen cooperation with Israel”.    

2011 deal on sales of Israeli EL/M-2080 “Green Pine” ground based missile defense systems and Gabriel-5 anti-ship missiles between Israel and Azerbaijan should also be viewed as a part of Israel’s input into security of the critical energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan. Although these defense systems are irrelevant to Nagorno-Karabakh theatre of war, the issue was subject to organized hysteria not only in many Iranian, but also Russian and Armenian media. Of course accusations were very unserious from Moscow, bearing in mind that a year before Russians had sold Azerbaijan S-300 ground based missile defense systems, which they had rejected to sell to Iran.     

Taking into account abundance of critical software in the energy sector of Azerbaijan, particular importance must be paid to cybersecurity. Israeli experience may be extremely useful for Azerbaijan. Although offensive capabilities of Iran’s cyberspace resources are rather unclear, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards cyberspace warfare program employed in 2008 2400 professionals with a budget of $76 million. According to the US and Israeli experts, at the moment Iran’s Revolutionary Guards possess the following capabilities: 
•    Developing infected software by inserting malicious codes capable of reproducing in networks and attacking target computers; 
•    Developing capabilities to block communications and WiFi networks; 
•    Developing tools for penetrating computers and networks to gather intelligence and pass it on remote servers; 
•    Developing delay mechanisms installed in target computers to be operated by a predetermined schedule or command from control servers. 

The US and Israeli experts report constant progress of Iran’s cyberspace capabilities, which like its nuclear program are not particularly sophisticated, but incrementally moving forward. And Iranians possess experience of limited success in cyberspace offensive. “Shamoon” virus for Saudi Arabian Aramco oil company and Qatar’s ResGas liquefied gas production company in August 2012 can be named as examples. 

Azerbaijani experts on cyberspace protection of critical energy infrastructure may enjoy soon a chance to learn and share experience with their colleagues from Israel. During Israeli foreign affairs minister Avigdor Liberman’s visit to Baku on April 23–24, 2012, information leak went to local media that Azerbaijan’s SOCAR acquired a 5% stake in Israel’s major “Med Ashdod” offshore oilfield exploration project. Besides that, Caspian Drilling Company (CDC), a company subsidiary of SOCAR, is going to be the major drilling contractor in this project. Although this is SOCAR’s first project in Israel, and although 280 million barrels of oil reserves at “Med Ashdod” and Azerbaijan’s stake there are humble, the fact of successful market entry is a symbol of confidence from Israeli partners. Of course experience of contracting on Israeli soil is a chance for knowledge and experience sharing. 

There is growing understanding from local think tanks also. Energy security was the major topic of “Cooperative Approach to Energy Security: View from NATO and Beyond” international conference organized by the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan in November 2013 in Baku. Among the participants were representatives of the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan, NATO liaison offices in the South Caucasus, NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence, NATO Energy Security Section, European Commission’s Joint Research Center, and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 

Analysts generally agree that there are no immediate “red alert” level threats to the critical energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Nevertheless, there is highly complicated geopolitical context on the background. More than five years ago the South Caucasus entered new stage of geopolitical reality, shifting from being a “post-Soviet region”, to being rather a “post-August 2008 region”. “It seems that the best way Georgia can be ruled is by Russian governor-general from Vorontsov palace in Tbilisi”, said recently Yana Amelina, one of the leading analysts of RISS, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, close to Kremlin. 

What we actually see in the South Caucasus context is that energy security bears implications not just in terms of critical infrastructure and limited political risk, but implication of much more global character with many “what if’s”. August 2008 was an important signal of what can happen. Explosion took place on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in Turkey on August 6, 2008, two days before war broke our between Russia and Georgia. This pipeline got closed. After Azerbaijan rerouted its export oil to Baku-Supsa pipeline, speculative Russian bombings around this pipeline in Western Georgia were reported. And on August 12, 2008 BP closed Baku-Supsa pipeline temporarily for safety reasons.     

Azerbaijan currently supplies over a third of Israel’s oil supplies. And most of energy resources in the Middle East are concentrated in Israel’s enemies hands. The U.S., Israeli, and Turkish interests in securing energy routes from the Caspian Sea are based on mutual foreign policy interest synergies in the South Caucasus and the Central Asia, and closely linked with providing some form of deterrence to Russia and Iran in the region and letting the smaller states feel more comfortable with their energy trade with the West. 

At the same time, there are controversies and differences also in the US, Israeli, and Turkish approaches and rhetoric, what implies presence of less articulated individual interests of all three. For example, perspectives of improving stalled relations between Turkey and Israel are uncertain. There are questions in Baku also towards some aspects of Ankara’s “new-Ottoman” policy, especially on 1915 issue and Turkish attempts to trade the issue in 2008 with some conditions, like opening border with Armenia (the border was closed in 1993 on the peak of Azerbaijani–Armenian war in Nagorno-Karabakh). Some senior US diplomats and intelligence officials are not positive about Israel’s intensified military cooperation with Azerbaijan, which, as they think, complicates American efforts to minimize Israeli – Iranian tensions. This trend has been even more articulated after Hassan Rouhani won presidential elections in Iran. In Israel itself there are comments from time to time that domestic weaknesses and tensions with neighbors can entangle Israel in additional conflicts. Additionally, Azerbaijan’s dependence on exports of Russian modern heavy weapons still exists, explained partially by Russian efforts to balance the status-quo in Nagorno-Karabakh and pressure Armenia also from time to time, and partially by Azerbaijan’s first class payment capacity and diversified policy in military import. These are the controversies of South Caucasus.      

Analysis shows that despite president Rouhani’s sweet talk, the US is risking to be left “with no cards to play” when trying to draft final agreement with Iran, while Rouhani just seems trying to kill time. And there is a growing lack of trust between the US and Israel with the Israelis’ concern that the initial agreement will become a permanent one. “If this lack of credibility continues and the US diplomatic leverage continues to erode, an Israeli military option – as the only possible response to the Iranian nuclear challenge – will become relevant once again”, comments Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin from INSS, The Institute of National Security Studies, Tel Aviv.

It means that within the framework of peripheral diplomacy or within a different foreign policy behavior model, Israel will keep close eye on the Caspian Sea. The issue of energy security in the Caspian Sea will continue to be one of the discussed topics in Israel’s political establishment, and its implications on Israel’s foreign policy will only grow and get incorporated into Israeli system of understanding threats and opportunities. 
 
Heydar Mirza is a leading research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan (SAM). SAM is a Natural Gas Europe Knowledge Partner.