ISS Europa: Russian policy in the eastern Mediterranean and the implications for EU external action

In many ways, both Soviet and post-Communist Russian policy in the Mediterranean can be clearly identified with classic Realpolitik. Like the Soviet Union, modern Russia has followed a policy of slow but steady strategic and economic penetration into the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, especially Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. It should be noted that this penetration was achieved primarily through indirect tactics. Rather than take overt political actions, Moscow supported various political groups and governments with a view to weaking ties with the West and extend Russian influence southward. This strategy manifested itself in the Kremlin’s stance on the Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus in 2004, when Russia torpedoed a UN resolution, backed by the EU, Turkey and the USA, to provide sufficient security guarantees for the implementation of the Plan.

In its attempt to keep all sides satisfied, the Kremlin followed an often contradictory policy in the Mediterranean. In times of peace and stability this relative inconsistency was not apparent, but when tensions came to a head and Moscow was forced to choose sides, it became clear that Moscow would prefer to adopt an ambiguous stance, appeasing one side so as not to jeopardise the progress it had made in its relations with another. This stance can be clearly seen in the differing Russian positions in the Syrian-Turkey conflict and in the Greco-Turkish confrontation over the Aegean Sea. Russia’s main objective was to ensure, at any cost, as broad an influence as possible in a region that was rapidly gaining importance on account of both its energy reserves and key strategic position.   MORE