Turkish Relations with Russia Hinge on Iran
One of Russia's main strategic goals is to extend its influence in the periphery of the former Soviet Union. In order to guarantee its security, Russia is also committed to maintaining a strong naval presence in the Black Sea. Turkey, on the other hand, aspires to take on a greater geopolitical role as a leader in the region. Its goals include normalizing relations with Armenia and strengthening its cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Most important, Turkey aims to diversify its energy imports, which come largely from Russia. In order to secure the geographically significant Anatolian peninsula and to guard essential shipping lanes, Turkey is also committed to maintaining a presence in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean region.
Both Russia and Turkey face constraints. Although Moscow enjoys close military and economic cooperation with Armenia, it faces a variety of challenges in its relationship with the rest of the Caucasus. Despite improved relations between Russia and Georgia, the unresolved issues surrounding the status of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- which provide Russia with influence in Georgia -- limit Moscow's ability to fully normalize relations with its southern neighbor. Russia's goal of increasing its influence in Azerbaijan is constrained by Baku's pursuit of a foreign policy that aims to limit Russian influence.
Turkey has been unable to cement its own relations with neighboring Armenia as a result of that country's inability to overcome its differences with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh . As long as the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the historically disputed area continues, Turkey will be unable to fully resolve its differences with Yerevan.
Russia's efforts to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean Sea and to establish new bases in strategic locations such as Cyprus are constrained by the Black Sea Fleet's geographic location. The Russian navy's ability to project power in the eastern Mediterranean depends on Turkey's continued consent for Russian naval vessels to pass through the Bosporus. While the 1936 Montreux Convention guarantees Russian ships access to the strait, Ankara's interpretation and implementation of the agreement may shift as geopolitical dynamics change. Much to Moscow's concern, Turkey enjoys some flexibility in how it applies the Convention's rules, as the presence of U.S. ships in the Black Sea during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 demonstrated.
In terms of energy, Turkey is largely dependent on Russian natural gas. Despite geographic proximity to Iraq and Iran, political and security challenges in both countries have thus far prevented Ankara from importing oil or gas in significant quantities. Russia provides 60 percent of Turkey's natural gas imports, compared to 18 percent of natural gas imports (and 15 percent of oil imports) from Iran.
While 7 percent of Turkey's oil currently comes from Iraq, an augmentative energy strategy has focused on an independent oil pipeline linking Turkey with the oil-producing Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq . The pipeline is ready for operation, but Ankara is still trying to negotiate with Baghdad over what is a politically sensitive issue.
Iran talks shifting regional dynamics
The recent rounds of talks between Iran and the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1), which led to the interim nuclear deal , could shift the aims and constraints facing Turkey and Russia. Presented with a resurgent and less isolated Iran, both countries will foreseeably take up the task of limiting Tehran's influence in the Caucasus. Maintaining leverage in the Caucasus, however, means different things in Ankara as opposed to Moscow.
Russia has traditionally supported Armenia and Azerbaijan, arming both in order toincrease its own influence. Moscow also maintains military outposts across the Caucasus, such as the 102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia, about 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) from the Turkish border. As well as extending its lease on the base until 2044, Russia in June deployed a number of its Iskander-M theater ballistic missile systems (based around a mobile erector/launcher capable of engaging targets 400 kilometers away). While the 102nd military base is part of the Commonwealth of Independent States' joint air defense system (established in 1996 and incorporating Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan), the deployment of the Iskander system can be interpreted as a show of strength directed at Azerbaijan and Turkey. Russia can be expected to continue its strategy of military deployment as it works to curtail Turkish and Iranian influence and ambitions in the region.
Turkey is also shifting its policies to account for a potentially resurgent Iran, advocating for a rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Davutoglu discussed the topic with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on Nov. 18. For Turkey, normalizing relations with Armenia while boosting its ties with Azerbaijan will be key to limiting Iranian influence in the region. Recognizing Turkey's attempts at reconciliation, Armenia invited the Turkish and Azerbaijani foreign ministers to attend a summit in Yerevan on Dec. 12. Davutoglu accepted the offer and traveled to Armenia, but the Azerbaijani foreign minister sent a lower-ranked official in his place.
Despite publicly supporting the negotiations, Russia's covert interest will be to prolong the conflict in order to consolidate its own power and influence. These contradictory approaches to the Caucasus are likely to increase tensions between Russia and Turkey.
The Iran talks are also changing the constraints faced by Turkey and Russia. If the international community continues unfreezing Iranian funds, Tehran will have much-needed cash available to invest in its energy sector. Should Iran reach a final deal regarding its nuclear program, other countries could lift sanctions, giving private corporations as well as international agencies the opportunity to invest in the country's infrastructure, or even provide loans.
Although it will be some time before Iran is fully modernized, it holds the world's second-largest natural gas reserves. The lifting of sanctions and controls will increase Tehran's ability to export energy to countries such as Turkey, thus aiding Ankara in its efforts to diversify its energy sources away from Moscow.
Davutoglu has met with his Iranian counterpart twice since early November, while Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to host Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in January before traveling to Tehran himself later that month. While Turkey's economic dependence on Russia will continue in the near future, diversification will allow Ankara to pursue a more assertive policy in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions.
Russia's likely response to Turkey's assertiveness will be to increase its influence in Georgia and Azerbaijan and accelerate the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Russia will compete with Iran to maintain the dominant share of Turkey's energy market. Russia and Turkey will probably continue their cooperation on joint projects such as the Russian-financed Akkuyu nuclear power plant in the southern town of Buyukeceli. Still, Russia's leverage in Turkey will decrease over time.
In the long run, however, a resurgent Iran could challenge both Russian and Turkish interests, especially in the Caucasus, where the three powers have historically competed for influence.
In Armenia, for example, Iran could challenge Russia's economic and political influence by increasing natural gas exports to the country. The Iran-Armenia pipeline has a capacity of 2.2 billion cubic meters a year, yet in 2012 Armenia only imported 488.3 million cubic meters of liquefied natural gas from Iran. Armenia relies on Russia for nearly all of its natural gas supplies, but should more Iranian gas become available, Armenia could begin to diversify away from Russia. While this is a long-term process and Armenia will continue to cooperate with Russia economically and militarily, energy exports will provide Iran with a potent lever of influence.
In Azerbaijan, Iran could undermine Russian and Turkish commercial and strategic interests. Tehran has concerns about Azerbaijan's influence on the significant Azeri minority in Iran and may seek a resolution. Azerbaijan, in turn, has sought to balance Iran in the past by allying with rivals such as Israel. Recent incidents across the Iranian-Azerbaijani frontier have also stoked tensions, with several temporary border closures occurring over the past few months. A stronger Iran will plausibly attempt to marginalize its neighbor, while Turkey and Russia will work to safeguard their own interests in energy-wealthy Azerbaijan.
Irrespective of final outcomes, warming relations between Iran and the West are shifting geopolitical dynamics throughout the region. Should the reconciliation create a better investment climate and, ultimately, an increase in energy production in Iran, Turkey will become less reliant on Russia and begin asserting itself more in the Black Sea and the Caucasus.
In the longer term, however, both Russia and Turkey can be expected to compete with Iran for influence in the Caucasus, where a resurgent Tehran will likely threaten Russian and Turkish economic and strategic interests.
Natural Gas Europe is pleased to provide this article in cooperation with Stratfor, a Natural Gas Europe Knowledge Partner. For more visit http://www.stratfor.com/ Follow Stratfor: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook