When the Ukrainian government suspended its efforts to sign an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) last week, the decision’s reverberations rattled even Washington. At a minimum, Ukraine’s deeper integration into the Euro-Atlantic community will likely lose momentum without the benefits of an AA. This has left many to ask: who is to blame for the abrupt reversal in Kyiv’s foreign policy approach to the West?

Immediately following the decision, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the EU had tried and failed to blackmail Kyiv into signing the association and trade agreement — a remark greeted with ridicule by those familiar with the enormous economic pressure that the Kremlin has placed on Ukraine. Even Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych himself reportedly told Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė on November 21^st that the decision not to sign the AA was a result of “economic pressure and blackmail” from Russia.

Indeed, for the last several months, Ukrainian exports have been selectively kept from entering Russia, in a clear violation of Moscow’s World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. The Kremlin has focused on products important to Ukraine’s heavy industry and agriculture; products that comprise a large portion of the 25 percent of the country’s total exports that go to Russia. Ukraine, unfortunately, was too intimidated by Moscow to complain to the WTO’s arbitration body. And yet, even as the Kremlin was increasing its coercive pressure on Kyiv to join a competing Eurasian Customs Union, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov continuously accused the EU of exerting “unforgivable pressure” for what should be Ukraine’s  “sovereign decision.”

The comments by Putin and Lavrov would be comical if the stakes for Europe, and especially Ukraine, were not so high. On September 5^th, Elmar Brok, the Chairman of the EU Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee labeled as “blackmail” Russia’s actions in forcing Armenia to join the Eurasian Union instead of moving closer to Europe. In a telling remark, the Armenian Interior Minister said that his country had been subjected to “intense coercion that would have brought domestic instability,” had it signed on with the EU’s Association Agreement. Can there be any doubt that Moscow exerted at least as much pressure on Kyiv? Putin has repeatedly made clear that he considers Ukraine an integral part of Greater Russia and the centerpiece of his efforts to re-establish hegemony over the former Soviet space. In fact, Russia’s Orthodox Patriarch, military officers and other officials have been enlisted in the effort to bring their “little brother” state, or “the Ukraine,” back into the fold.

Yet, the primary responsibility for failing to resist Moscow’s coercion rests with the Yanukovych administration. It was his decision to give into short-term blackmail rather than to take the long view on the advantages that the EU would have provided had he moved his country closer into the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations. Russia has little to offer Ukraine in terms of modern development, especially when compared to Europe. There are varying estimates of the economic advantages that signing an AA would bring to Ukraine, but the net GDP gain for the country would likely be three to four times higher than joining Russia’s competing Eurasian Customs Union. Putin thus had to resort to coercion, since the only tool at his disposal is the threat of the negative consequences for Kyiv.

Looking ahead, the Kremlin will likely use Kyiv’s policy reversal as an opening to tighten its grip on key business and diplomatic sectors in Ukraine. To this end, it is easier for Kyiv to comply with Moscow’s terms, since Russia never requires any fundamental reforms from the government. Pervasive corruption and a lack of transparency work in favor of the Kremlin’s ability to influence events in neighboring countries. Ultimately, with no reform requirements and thus realistic prospects of change, Kyiv’s decision, unless reversed, will result in economic stagnation and widespread emigration of Ukraine’s best and brightest to the West.

How should the West react to Kyiv’s decision and Moscow’s practices then? First of all, the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) should be strengthened, not abandoned. More so, the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) should not reward the Yanukovych government for the reversal of its policy course to the East. Any assistance should be firmly tied to Ukraine’s progress on the reform process. Nor should Russia be absolved from its responsibility of obstructing the completion of “Europe whole, free and at peace.” EU leaders should quietly let Moscow know that pursuing imperial policies in the heart of Europe is not without economic and political consequences. Among others, the EU should be firmer in enforcing Russia’s compliance with all WTO obligations and could take swifter action to implement the Third Energy Package. The latter is a key part of Brussels’ regulatory defense against Moscow’s energy influence in Europe.

The EaP should also become a policy priority for the larger, wealthier members of the EU. Its implementation has so far been left to smaller EU members in Central Europe — countries who have less influence and economic clout vis-à-vis Moscow. Western Europe should play a much more active role in the effort to bring Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community. Young Ukrainians yearn to be Euro-Ukrainians, and these aspirations should be recognized and actively supported by Berlin, Paris, Rome, London, as well as Washington.

Recognizing this desire, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry should issue a joint statement deploring Russian pressure on Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova, while encouraging Kyiv to return to active discussions with the EU. Thousands of Ukrainians have already taken to the streets to protest their government’s decision to turn away from Europe. European and American observers should carefully follow the actions of Kyiv and Moscow in dealing with these ongoing peaceful protests. Any thuggery by government forces, of the type that occurred during the 2004 Ukrainian elections, should be documented and widely publicized.

Lastly, Brussels and Washington should press strongly for a nationwide referendum in Ukraine. This would allow Ukrainians themselves to decide whether their country’s orientation should be toward Asia or Europe. Allowing the citizens of Ukraine a direct voice in their own future is only right. Unabashedly supporting those aspirations from the United States and Western Europe is entirely appropriate.

This article by Keith C. Smith was first published on cepa.org. CEPA is a Natural Gas Europe Knowledge Partner.